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Sims v. Dist. Ct., 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 13
(April 30, 2009) 1
Criminal Law- Presentation of Evidence in Competency Hearing
Summary
Petitioners filed writs of mandamus challenging the district court orders denying
petitioners’ requests to present evidence during competency hearings.
Disposition/Outcome
The Nevada Supreme Court held that defense counsel may introduce independent
competency evaluations if they are relevant to the issue of the defendant’s competency and their
probative value is not substantially outweighed by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Accordingly, because petitioners’ independent
competency evaluations were relevant, and their probative value was not substantially
outweighed by the aforementioned considerations, the Court granted the petitions.
Factual and Procedural History
In early 2007, petitioner Caroline Marie Sims was charged with one count each of home
invasion while in possession of a deadly weapon, carrying a concealed weapon, and burglary
while in possession of a deadly weapon. Petitioner Kanohea Samuel Heaukulani was charged
with one count of open or gross lewdness. After these charges were filed, defense counsel raised
concerns at the justice court level regarding the petitioners’ competency to stand trial.
The justice court bound petitioners to respondent Eighth Judicial District Court Judge
Jackie Glass (Department 5) for a resolution of the competency issues. As such, the court
appointed two psychologists to evaluate the petitioners. After, the court reviewed the reports and
held that the petitioners were competent to stand trial. Thereafter, defense counsel for petitioners
ordered independent competency evaluations for each petitioner. The results from the
independent examinations were unanimous in their conclusion that petitioners were not
competent to stand trial.
Upon receiving the results of the independent examinations, defense counsel for
petitioners again raised the issue of competency to stand trial. The trial judge transferred the
competency matters back to Department 5, as “all competency matters are assigned to a
particular district court judge.” 2 Court-appointed competency examiners then examined
petitioners, again. Finally, defense counsel moved to admit the results from the independent
examinations; however, the motions were denied.
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Fergusen v. State, 192 P.3d 712,718 (Nev. 2008).

Discussion
The crux of this issue is in the interpretation by the parties of NRS 178.415(3).
Petitioners’ writs concern whether defense counsel is permitted under the statute to introduce
independent competency evaluations during the competency hearing. The Court found that
because statutory interpretation is a matter of law, it reviewed Department 5’s interpretation de
novo. 3
I. Plain Language of Statute
The Court must first look to the statute’s plain language. 4 If the plain language of the
statute is either ambiguous or if the plain meaning of the statute was clearly not intended by the
Legislature, the Court will look to the legislative intent. 5 NRS 178.415(3) provides that, upon
receiving the competency reports from the court-appointed competency examiners, the court
“shall permit counsel for both sides to examine the person or persons appointed to examine the
defendant.” 6 Additionally, “the [parties] may: (a) Introduce other evidence including…evidence
related to treatment to competency and the possibility of ordering the involuntary administration
of medication; and (b) cross-examine one another’s witnesses.” 7
Here, the Court found the language of the statute to be plain and unambiguous. To
illustrate this finding, the Court opined that the language in no way limits the prosecuting
attorney’s or defense counsel’s ability to introduce evidence during a competency hearing.
Furthermore, the plain meaning is evidenced by the phrases “other evidence” and “without
limitation,” which denote legislative intent. 8
The plain language of the statute notwithstanding, Department 5 argued that the court
must look to legislative intent for guidance. The Court recognized that the plain and
unambiguous language indicated no need to look to legislative intent, nonetheless, the Court
acquiesced to respondent’s contention and still found no intent beyond that which is clearly
delineated in the plain language of the statute.
II. Probative Value of Independent Evaluations
Next, the Court evaluated the issue of whether petitioners’ independent competency
evaluations were properly excluded as an undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence. The Court applied the analysis used in Calvin v. State. 9
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Firestone v. State, 83 P.3d 279,281 (Nev. 2004).
Id.
5
Id.; see also State v. State, Employees Assoc., 720 P.2d 697,699 (1986) (determining that “plain
and unambiguous” language within a statute “must be given effect” unless from the language of
the statute “it clearly appears that such was not so intended”).
6
NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.415(3)(a)-(b) (2007).
7
Id.
8
Alsenz v. Clark Co. School Dist., 864 P.2d 285,287 (Nev. 1993) (word “including” is generally
given expansive reading, even without additional language of “without limitations”).
9
147 P.3d 1097 (Nev. 2006).
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In Calvin, the Court concluded that while the district court has the discretionary authority
to admit or exclude evidence during the competency hearing, the competency process will be
much better “served when the district court and any appointed experts consider a wide scope of
relevant evidence at every stage of the competency hearing.” 10 However, even if the evidence
being proffered is relevant, the district court may still exclude the evidence “if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” 11
Here, Department 5 determined that the competency evaluations were relevant; however,
it determined that the probative value was substantially outweighed by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Department 5 claimed the
reports were cumulative because the court had already received competency reports from courtappointed examiners.
The Court concluded that Department 5’s line of reasoning was both an arbitrary and
capricious exercise of discretion, because accuracy in the competency record is much better
served when the district court considers a wide scope of relevant evidence. The independent
evaluations were relevant. Furthermore, as the report was a single evaluation, consideration of
the report will not cause an undue delay. Moreover, the independent evaluations will not waste
time or constitute needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Conclusion
The Court held that petitioners are entitled to introduce their independent competency
evaluations during the competency hearing since the evaluations are relevant to the issue of
competency and the probative value is not outweighed by NRS 48.035(2). Accordingly, the
Court granted petitioners’ writs of mandamus instructing the district court to consider
petitioners’ independent competency evaluations at their competency hearings.
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Id. at 1183.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.035(2) (2007).

